“I wasn’t sure that would work,” Mike said. “The ranges were longer than he’d trained on. I wanted to make sure the sniper fire was good enough to really sting them. But I did pull out too late.”

“Your movement, given the closeness of the pursuit, was about par,” Nielson said, pointing to the map. “Why did you choose to be the bait and send Praz and Lasko directly up the mountain?”

“I was in better shape to run,” Mike said, shrugging. “Praz and Lasko weren’t up to my level of condition. As it turned out, they probably could have made it just as well, but it was a tough hump. In the situation, I took the danger point.”

“On reaching the ambush point you took one of the security bunkers for your position,” Nielson said. “Why? You couldn’t maintain view of the battle from there.”

“I was following Chief Adams’ direction,” Mike said. “I assume that the pursuit party was close enough that Adams just wanted me to get to ground and that was the nearest bunker.”

“In the planning stage you failed to consider the mortars for support,” Nielson said, checking off an item on the list.

“Agreed,” Mike said. “I’d thought of them solely in terms of fixed position use. I’m glad you remembered them,” he added to chuckles through the room.

“Which brings us to the most critical danger point in this action: command and control,” Nielson said. “The true commander of the mission was the Kildar. But he was forward deployed and in action for the majority of the mission. I was managing the battle, but I wasn’t in command. The Kildar should have either relinquished command of the battle or moved to a position that he could manage all the pieces. It worked, because the Kildar and I could work together very well. But one or the other of us should have been designated for command and that person should have been in a position to control the flow of the battle.”



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